Summary: The Trump administration and American tech giants have shifted Europe’s tech-policy balance. Big-ticket EU rules — the AI Act, Digital Services Act, Digital Markets Act, Digital Networks Act, even the EU Space Act — are stalled, watered down, or under legal attack. Brussels risks ending the year with little progress and weakened rules. Below I break down what’s happened, why it matters, who pushed back, and what choices Europe faces next. Read slowly; this is a negotiation, not a sprint.
Interrupt — What just changed?
Pressure from Washington and heavy lobbying by US-based tech firms has real teeth. Since the tariff agreement signed last August, lobbying intensified. The result: Europe’s most important tech-policy initiatives are now on hiatus, with many facing the prospect of rollback. The phrase that keeps appearing in briefings and leaks is: “on hiatus.” On hiatus — delayed, diluted, deferred. That’s not a neutral status; it is a change in power during a critical policy window.
Engage — Why this matters
Regulation shapes markets for a decade. If enforcement timelines are pushed, or substance is hollowed out, supply chains, R&D incentives, and privacy protections all shift. Public trust in technology policy falls when deadlines slip and rules are reshaped behind closed doors. The immediate winners are incumbents with deep legal teams and lots of lobbying cash. The long-term losers may be startups, consumers, and the public interest.
The AI Act: Delay and erosion
The EU AI Act entered into force in August 2024 with staged implementation to August 2027 and a key milestone in 2026. Now Brussels is considering amendments via a Digital Omnibus package, possibly at the end of 2026. The most visible change on the table: postponing enforcement penalties for a year — from August 2026 to August 2027 — to give providers more time to comply. Postponing penalties shifts the incentives for compliance. It gives companies breathing room. It also sends a signal to markets and to innovators: regulatory risk is lower for now.
Thomas Regnier, spokesman for the Commission on Digital Sovereignty, said standards are lagging and there are concerns from industry and member states. That’s an honest, technocratic message. It’s also an admission of pressure — internal and external — and the political choice to fold those concerns into a larger omnibus. The omnibus may simplify guidelines, but it may also create loopholes.
Open question: which trade-offs should Europe accept between speed of enforcement and legal certainty? Who pays the price when enforcement is delayed?
Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act: Strained and stretched
Both the DSA and DMA were meant to be Europe’s leverage: rules to rebalance platform power and set content moderation and competition standards. Today, enforcement timelines are lengthening under the strain of legal appeals and diplomatic pressure. Apple and Google have publicly criticized the DMA. The Federal Trade Commission warned last year that some DSA rules might conflict with US laws, pointing to free-speech tensions and security concerns. Those warnings reduce political cover for strict enforcement in Brussels.
Mirroring the argument: “strained negotiations” — that’s the phrase industry uses; Brussels hears “strained negotiations.” The question for regulators is whether to hold the line or to trade concessions for smoother market access. If regulators concede, the net effect will be a looser playing field for Big Tech and less protection for consumers.
Open question: should the EU trade enforcement certainty for political calm, or should it demand commitments backed by concrete milestones?
The Digital Networks Act and telecom friction
The Digital Networks Act was expected by year-end but is stalled. Member states cannot agree on major items: the phase-out of copper networks (Germany rejects a 2030 deadline) and stronger powers for BEREC (national regulators fear losing authority). Net-neutrality revisions have been dropped from the current working draft. Rebalancing telecoms versus Big Tech remains vague. The single telecom market project is losing momentum.
This is a classic sovereignty fight dressed as technical disagreement. National authorities cite different market conditions — a legitimate point — but they also fear loss of influence. The result is delay and dilution. That ensures incumbents keep their advantages while cross-border coordination fades.
Open question: how should Europe reconcile national control with a single market that requires harmonised rules?
EU Space Act: A diplomatic stand-off
The US State Department fired a formal shot at the EU Space Act, calling the draft “unacceptable” and saying it contradicts the spirit of the tariff agreement. In a 13‑page response to Brussels’ consultation, Washington urged revisions to avoid retaliation and to keep cooperation open between governments and industry. The State Department’s stance is blunt: don’t add barriers that block US operations.
That reaction raises a basic diplomatic choice: preserve regulatory ambition and risk a trade fight, or water down rules to keep transatlantic commerce smooth. Either choice has costs for Europe’s autonomy in space services and for its industrial strategy.
Open question: can Europe push for strategic autonomy in space while maintaining practical cooperation with US partners?
Spectrum and the 6-GHz fight
The US State Department lobbied on behalf of Wi‑Fi industry players — Apple, Broadcom, Cisco, Qualcomm — to protect the upper 6‑GHz band for high-speed, low-latency Wi‑Fi use cases. The Radio Spectrum Policy Group proposed a compromise favoring mobile operators, but the recommendation is not binding. MLex reported that 13 of 27 member states sided with mobile operators; others abstained. The final decision sits with the Commission, but the pressure campaign has already reshaped the debate.
Spectrum policy is technical, but its implications are economic and strategic. Reserve too much for Wi‑Fi and mobile operators lose capacity; reserve too little and new Wi‑Fi services are constrained. Big vendors, telecom operators, and cloud gaming firms all have skin in the game. That explains the intense lobbying from both sides — and why Washington intervened for its companies.
Open question: who should set spectrum priorities in Europe — national markets, the Commission, or technocratic groups with industry ties?
Legal fights and the softening of rules
Several initiatives face legal challenges before they even take effect. The DMA and DSA draw court appeals and regulatory pushback. The EU Space Act is already under fire from Washington. Litigation and cross‑border political pressure raise the cost of strict rules. Firms with deep pockets can delay enforcement through appeals, stretching timelines and raising uncertainty for startups and smaller players.
Social proof matters here: when major firms challenge rules, others follow. That cascade lowers the political appetite for tough enforcement. The effect is consistent: more delay, more uncertainty, more leverage for incumbents.
Open question: how can Brussels design rules that are legally durable and enforceable without provoking avoidable trade conflict?
What this means for innovation, competition and public goods
If enforcement is delayed and substance diluted, the short-term result is less compliance cost and more market certainty for incumbents. The long-term result may be weaker competition, slower diffusion of privacy-friendly models, and reduced trust among citizens. That outcome is bad for public welfare and bad for new entrants who need clear rules to plan investment.
At the same time, rushing ill-prepared standards can harm innovation if rules are technically inconsistent or poorly aligned with global norms. The policy problem is real: how to set firm rules that are precise enough to be enforced and flexible enough to fit fast-moving tech.
Open question: how can Europe hold to principles of consumer protection and fair competition while setting standards that are workable for innovators?
Negotiation realities — who holds the cards?
The US has leverage: market size, trade instruments, and diplomatic channels. Big Tech has leverage: legal teams, lobbying budgets, and platform power. Member states have leverage: national vetoes and regulatory control. Brussels has leverage: rule‑making authority and the ability to set market rules that apply across 27 countries. But leverage only matters when actors use it consistently.
Mirroring a central fact: “leverage only matters when actors use it.” Repeat it, because it’s the hinge. If Europe wants leverage to matter, it must be prepared to press enforcement, to coordinate member states, and to accept trade friction as a possible cost of protecting the public interest. Or Europe must accept a different bargain: looser rules in exchange for smoother relations with Washington. Both paths are choices, not inevitabilities.
Open question: is European policy aimed at protecting citizens or at preserving short-term market access? Can it do both?
Practical steps Brussels, member states and civil society can take
1) Commit to transparency. Publish timelines, impact assessments, and red lines for negotiations. Commitments build credibility and coil down doubts from markets.
2) Harden legal drafting. Remove easy loopholes that invite litigation. Stronger drafting reduces the appeals window and the value of delay.
3) Coordinate member states. Use clear incentives to align national regulators around common goals. Where national differences are real, allow narrow, time-bound exemptions rather than open-ended opt-outs.
4) Use reciprocity. If US actors seek favorable treatment, demand equivalent market openness or regulatory cooperation that preserves EU policy aims. Reciprocity is a bargaining chip — use it.
5) Build public coalitions. Civil society, startups, and consumer groups can be force multipliers. Public opinion matters; it imposes political costs on rolling back protections.
Open question: which of these levers do you think Brussels will use — and which will member states resist?
Empathy and the political reality
I empathise with officials under pressure. They must balance industrial jobs, investor reactions, and international relationships. I also empathise with civil-society actors who want stricter protection and with entrepreneurs who need legal certainty. Those are competing, legitimate interests. Negotiation is about making those interests visible and trading where possible without sacrificing core principles.
Silence for a moment. Think about the choice: accept weaker rules for easier access, or insist on robust rules and risk trade fights. What do you choose?
Final reflection — No is a tool
Saying No has value. It forces serious offers, not empty promises. Europe can say No to backroom dilution; that No can trigger better offers from partners. Saying No does not mean permanent rupture. It means clearer negotiations. Use No as a negotiating move, not as surrender.
The core facts are simple and stark: many EU tech initiatives are on hiatus, key enforcement dates are being reconsidered, and US pressure has shifted the balance. The choices now are political, legal, and strategic. Europe can accept softer rules and smoother commerce, or it can hold to tougher standards and accept friction. Which route preserves markets, protects citizens, and supports innovation? That is the negotiation Europe must win — and the public should press to shape it.
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Featured Image courtesy of Unsplash and Guillaume Périgois (wVqC9dty3VQ)
